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ABSTRACT

This paper traces the historical development in
the State of Maine of the procedures by which persons
found to be mentally unsound can be committed to insti
tutional care against their will.

Beginning in 1820 and

continuing to the present, specific changes in
utes governing this area are noted.

th~'

stat

Both-the criminal

.and civil commitment procedures are dealt with.

Fol

lowing the historical trace, pending legislation relating
to the criminal commitment process is examined in de
tail.

Finally, consideration is given to the need for

a complete reexamination of the practice of involuntary
commitment involving ethical and constitutional issues.

APPROVED BY,

READER

C ($1ITTED ON SENIOR

In ancient times there were no written laws which gov
erned the mentally disturbed.

Taboos and tribal customs how

ever, prescribed what in many cases were brutal physical. mea
sure8 designed to make the disturbed person normal according
to the ideology of the time (12, p.l).

At different times in

history mental disturbance has been viewed as caused by demons,
eelestial bodies, and supernatural powers.

In the past one

hundred and fifty years, the prevalent view has been that men
tal disturbance is essentially a medical problem. a view which
actually originated in the fourth century with Hippocrates, (12.
p. 1).

This ideology is reflected in the term "insane- which

lit.~Blly

means "unhealthy".

The first legal reference to the

mentally disturbed with respect to their incarceration oc
curred in 1676 when Massachusetts enacted a statute ordering
the officers of a town to restrain disturbed persons
they would not harm others (JO, p. 80).

80

that

The first hospital

to which the insane could be sent for treatment in the United
states was established in 177J at Williamsburg, Virginia (12.
p. 5).

At the time that Maine became a state in 1820, the

Williamsburg hospital was the only facility of its kind in
the United States.
This paper traces the statutory history in Maine of the
commitment of the mentally disturbed. the process by which
such people are incarcerated by society.

The historical

treatment of this subject is important for a thorough under
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standing of the commitment process today.

The actions of

the legislature reflect a great deal about the attitudes
of the populace of the time, for it is their will which the
legislature must aet upon.

As the legislative process con

tinues into the future, reflection on the past can shed
light on decisions which must be made.

The reasons for and

purposes of commitment have been developed over a long per
iod of time, and consideration of future changes should not
be made without an evaluation of the entire process including
the historical aspects.

The first legislators of the state of Maine wasted no
time in making sure that the statutes dealt with the problem
of insane persons in the state.

The first issue covered

involved the children of the insane.

It was provided that

the Judge of Probate could appoint a guardian to care for
the children of the insane "in the same manner as though their
parents were dead" (25. p. 177).

The Judge of Probate could

also upon recommendation from the selectmen, appoint a
guardian to administer the estate of the person (25. p. 177).
Thus for the purposes of the care of their children and the
administration of their estates, the insane had no more
rights than a dead man.

Here also can be seen the first

qualification of the insane as "lunatics, idiots, non compos.
or distracted persons" (25. p. 177).

So far there is only a
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provision for his estate and children, but what became of
the insane person himself?

A method for their commitment

was provided in chapter eXI, section 6.

When it was shown

to two justices (apparently any justice of any court al
though this was not detailed) that any person was so insane
"as to render it dangerous to the peace or the safety of the
good people for such person to go at largen, they could'
commit the person to the house of corrections "till he be
restored of his right mind" (25, p. 363).

The status of

the insane person as a convict is reinforced by the provi
sion that although debtors and minors had to be confined
separate from other criminals, the insane did not have to be
confined separately.

Unlike the criminal however, the insane

person had to pay for the expenses of his confinement and
in addition had to be put to work during the period (25.
p. 363).

Whether the reaSon to put the insane to work was

considered therapeutic or punitive is unclear, although there
probably was an element of both.
The first legislature also provided for the disposi
tion of the "insane criminal", those acquitted by the courts
or those not indicted by the Grand Jury because of insanity.
They too were to be committed to prison at their own ex
pense until they wereNrestored of right mind" (25, p.

207).

The only differences between the person convicted of a crime
and sentenced to prison and the person

acquitted~of

a crime
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by reason of insanity seem to be that the convicted crim
inal did not pay for his incarceration and in addition,
recieved a definite period of confinement. things not so
for the "acquitted" insane person.
These were the first set of statutes dealing with the
insane in Maine.

By way of summary, civil commitment could

be ordered when two justices found a person to bea

either

an idiot, lunatic, non compos, or distracted person and
a danger to the peace and safety of the community.

crimin

al commitment was automatic upon acquittal after a defense
of insanity.

In both cases, commitment was to prison for

an indefinite period at the person's expense.

It is inter

esting to note that the statutes do not mention the pro
cedures for release of a person so committed.

Apparently

it was up to the prison superintendent to decide whether
the person was restored of his right mind or not since there
were no provisions for a rehearing.

Although not mentioned

in the statutes, habeus corpus was of course available to
those aware of its use.

This writ requests a judicial deter

mination of the legality of continued confinement (23. p. 226).
Thus to be released on a writ of habeas corpus the committed
person would have to prove that either the procedures by
which he had been committed were not the correct ones, or
that he had been restored to right mind and confinement was
no longer justified

Another important facet of the commitment process
that was not written into the statutes involves the defense
of insanity.

As indicated previously, the first statutes

th~t

provlded~tho8e

acquitted by this defense be committedr but

there was no provision for the basis to be used to deter
mine the issue of insanity.
to decide.

This was left to the courts

It appears that the rule being applied at this

time was the simple "right-wrong" or "good and evil" test
originated in 1760 in the Ferrer decision (16, p. 142),
although exactly when it was adopted in Maine or under what
circumstances is not clear.

It was a carry-over of the old

Common Law rule in effect in Massachusetts before Maine
became a separate state.

The right-wrong test is extremely

simple and states that an accused criminal is to be found
not guilty by reason of insanity if he could not distin
guish the difference between right and wrong, in a general
sense (16, p. 142).

But the wording of the test was very

important in light of the statute providing automatic in
definite commitment upon acquittal.
The first major change in the commitment statutes
in Maine was anticipated in 18)4 with the filing of a re
port from the joint standing committee of the legislature
concerning the establishment of an insane hospital.

This

report painted out that formerly there had been no hope of
recovery for the insane but that developments in medicine

6.

and philosophy meant that "confinement of the insane need
no longer be merely for maintaining order in society" (J3f p.

657).

Examples were cited of successes in curing the insane

and it was estimated that there were over 550 insane persons
in the state (33, p. 657).

A few days after the filing of

this report, the legislature authorized twenty thousand
dollars for the erection of an insane hospital for "one
hundred lunatic persons furiously mad ••• " (33, p. 661).

The

intention of the legislature in this undertaking is especially
noteworthy since it represents a drastic policy change.

Clear

ly the intention was not merely to provide a separate
facility for punitive or custodial care but the very use of
the word hospital emphasizes that this was to be a facility
where the insane would receive treatment intended to cure
them.

Thus insanity was to be viewed as a medical problem

and the role of the insane person switched from convict to
patient, at least in theory.
In 1840 with the opening of the new Insane Hospital at
Augusta some changes were made in the commitment laws as
contained in the Revised statutes of 1841.

The procedure

remained the 8ame as before but commitment could now be
ordered to either prison or the insane hospital under both
the clvil and criminal processes. (34,;p. 721, 740).

Since

the hospital had a limited capacity, the statutes provided
that only those found to be dangerous could be committed
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under the civil process (34, p. 740).

Because of this, it

is not hard to see how the insane hospital came to be viewed
as not a hospital at all but a repository for dangerous
"lunatics" and the commitment process as a means of getting
the insane out of circulation rather than giving them treat
ment.

The fact that there were no provisions for volun

tary admission but that the only way one could be admitted
was through the involuntary judicial process, reinforced
this view.

Thus the aims of the legislators in setting up

the hospital were not met and the hospital acquired a
stigma which has been attached to it ever since.
This seems to have been recognized by the superinten
dent of the hospital in his first annual report to the leg
islature.

In it he states that the hospital "must receive

the most wretched that breathes the vital air and restore them
to reason .•• Then and only then will be fully and justly ap
preciated the beneficence of the enlightened Representatives
of this stateN (24. p. 21).

Likewise the governor recog

nized the problem in his recommending action to admit others
in need of care and treatment who were not deemed to be
Wao furiously mad as to be dangerous" (15. p. 21).
When the hospital first opened, the legislature took
no action concerning its regulation or operation.
handled through the office

o~

This was

the governor who appointed a

board ot trustees and a superintendent to supervise the oper
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ation of the hospital at the outset.

In 1847 however, the

legislature did take action and wrote into the statutes a
system to govern the hospital and in addition made many
changes in the commitment laws.

Briefly, the hospital was to

be governed by a board of trustees appointed by the governor
and a superintendent appointed by the trustees (1, p. 28).
The trustees were to examine the hospital annually and re
port on the "conditions, concerns and wants of the hospital"
with particular attention to be placed on the examination
and auditing of the accounts of the hospital (1, pp. 29-)0).
The superintendent's duty was to reside at the hospital at

all times and to be sure that the patients were apportioned
equally among the towns (1, p. 29).

Clearly the legislature

does not seem to have been overly concerned with what was
going on inside the hospital other than in making sure that
the books were in order and that money was being spent
fairly.

Any matters concerning the particular therapies or

regulations within the hospital including the size and qual
ifications of the staff. were left to the trustees to de
cide.

However, the legislature did not provide that the

trustees or the superintendent have any expertise in the
field of mental health care, although it did state that the
superintendent was to be a physician.(!, p. 28).
The changes made in the commitment statutes in 1847
were substantial.

It became the duty of the parents or guard
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ian of an insane minor to send him or her to the hospital
within thirty days after the onset of an attack of insanity,
if they were of sufficient means to support the expenses of
hospitalizatIon (1, p. 30).

No medical or legal review was

necessary, so the parents or guardian could apparently de
cide for themselves whether their child was insane or not.
For those not subject to this procedure a formal means of
civIl commitment was to be followed.

The municipal officers

(the mayor and aldermen) of a town constituted a board of
examiners who after a complaint in writing were authorized
to inquire into the condition of a person and to receive
"all testimony necessary for a full understanding of the
case" (1, p. 30).

If they found as a result of this testi

mony that the person was insane and that either his or
others' safety and comfort would be promoted by his commit
ment, they could direct the hospital to recleve and detain
him till he was restored of his right mind (1, p. 31).

As

previously was the case, the person or his guardian was li
able for the expenses of the commitment: but if neither were
able to pay, the town which authorized the commitment was
liable (1, p. )1).
The non-medical and particularly the non-judicial qual
ity of this procedure is striking when one remembers that
the result is to deprive a person of his liberty for an in
definite period.

There was however a judicial safeguard on
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this process, in the form of a provision for appeal.

The

appeal consisted of a hearing before two justices of the
peace who would hear any evidence presented to them and
decide upon the person's sanity and either affirm or over
turn the finding of the board ,of examiners (1. p. 31).
was however, a8 high as the appeal process could go.

This
As

is true of most legal processes. the poor were at a great
disadvantage since many could not afford to pay the appeal
expenses which amounted to two dollars a day and ten cents
per mile for each justice (1. p. 31).
Another important aspect of the 1847 revision of the
commitment laws was that for the first time a discharge
procedure (although a limited one) was written into the
statutes.

A person liable for the support of a patient

could apply to the municipal officers of the town from which
he had been committed and ask for an inquiry to determine
whether continued confinement was justified (i. p. 33).
After hearing all witnesses and information relative to the
SUbject the municipal officers could direct the hospital to
release or continue to detain the personr but in either case
their action was binding and could only be undertaken once
every six months (1. p. ))).
Although civil commitment to prison was no longer an
option after 1847. the statutes did permit it as an alter
native in cases involving criminal commitment.(l. p. )4).
It was stated however. that commitment in such cases could
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only be ordered to prison if there was no room available in
the hospital (1, p. 34).

A new way by which a person could

be committed through the criminal process was written into
the statutes at this time.

When it became known to the

judge of a court before which a person charged with a crim
inal offense was to be tried, that this person would plead
insanity as a defense to the charge. the jUdge could order
him detained in the insane hospital Ufttil further notice
from the court (1, p. )4).

Apparently the superintendent

had no authority at all to release a person so committed
but he was to report back to the court concerning the
"truth or falsity of the plea" (1. p. )4).

Under the En

glish Common Law it was an established principle that those
persons becoming insane before trial would not be tried

(16, p. 126).

This statute appears to be an attempt to

formalize this Common Law principle. however loosely.

The

statute is unclear as to exactly what should be the effect
of the hospital's finding when reported back to the court.
More importantly however, it lumps lumps together what
should be two separate judicial determinationst

the issue

of competency to stand trial and the issue of criminal re
sponsibility under the insanity defense.
The next major changes in the laws relating to the
commitment of the insane did not occur until 1871.

This

revision dealt primarily with expanding the discharge pro
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cess but made no changes in any statutes relating to the
actual commitment procedures themselves.

The duties of the

trustees on their annual inspection were further defined to
include their making ., a particular inspection into the
condition of each patient" (35, p•. 928).

They were au

thorized to discharge any patient whom they felt was re
stored to the point that neither his nor the public·s safety
and comfort required his continued confinement (35, p. 928).
This provision finally gave a standard for release that
could be worked with and did not rely merely upon the judge
ment of one person. the hospital superintendent, with no
guidance from the legislature.

However, it will be remem

bered that this standard was being applied by those who need
have no qualifications of expertise in the field of mental
health to be appointed.
A check was provided at this time on possible abuses
or injustices resulting from the commitment of insane "crim
inals~

before trial.

Those oommitted by the oourts prior

to trial for a determination of their sanity were to be re
leased by the superintendent if they were not called for by
the courts during the next term following confinement (35,
p. 933).

This sought to prevent the type of situation where

a person could be confined for a long period of time without
any judicial determination of his sanity.

Thus the courts

were forced to either permit the person to have his trial on

1).

the criminal charge or to initiate civil commitment proceed
ings against him.

This seems only reasonable. but until then

it had not been the case.
There were two other areas covered in the 1871 revi
sion which relate to the commitment process.

For the first

time the state began a trend towards absorbing the costs of
institutionalization, although on a very limited scale.
Towns with less than two hundred inhabitants did not have to
support their insane-- the state would (35, p. 932).

The

other area involved a provision for criminal penalties in
cluding a fine and imprisonment for those attendants at the
hospital found mistreating patients in any way (J5, 934).
This piece of legislation had come about as a result of an
investigation which had been conducted three years earlier
in 1868 into patient abuse (30), and marks for the first

time an attempt by the legislature to control conduct inside
the hospital.
During this time, while the legislature was writing
and revising the statutes relating to commitment, the courts
were hearing cases involving challenges to and interpreta
tions of the statutes.

Most of these cases had as a common

denominator a controversy over who was to pay for a partic
ular person's hospitalization expenses.

The legality of

having the selectmen of a town decide the issue of insanity
was challenged but affirmed in the case of "Inhabitants of
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Eastport v. Inhabitants of

Machias~

(21, p. 402).

The sel

ectmen were ruled to be the proper legal certifying officers
and their findings to be fact (21, p. 402).

In the case

"Overseers of Fairfield v. Guilifer", an important ruling was
made which excluded idiots (the mentally retarded) from the
class of "insane persons" for the purposes of commitment (28,
p. 360).

It was ruled that the judge of a probate court

could not appoint a guardian for such a person and he there
fore could not be committed (28, p. 360).

The principle of

this ruling was followed up and written into statutory form
in 1874 by an act which stated that the term "insane person"
could include an idiot, non compos, lunatic, or distracted
person but that in regard to their civil commitment, it
would not include idiotic or non compos persons (2, p. 157).
In 1870 there was an important development in the case
law which had a direct bearing on the criminal commitment
statutes.

In the case of "State v. Lawrence", Maine aban

doned the old right-wrong test for criminal responsibility
under a defense of insanity and adopted the revised or mod
ified right-wrong rule. (45, p. 574).

This new test, known

as the M'Naghten rule, was developed in 184) in England and
had gained acceptance in the United States with Maine being
one of the only states at the time which had not yet adopted
it.

The Maine version of the M'Naghten rule stated that to

be found not guilty by reason of insanity the accused must show
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" •.. that at the time of committing the act, he had not capa
city and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish be
ween right and wrong as to the particular act he was doing"

(45, p. 574).

It is further added that a partial derange

ment of the mind would not excuse the person from criminal
responsibility but a person must have profound defecits in
memory and understanding the relation between himself and
others (45 p. 574).

At first glance the M'Naghten rule as adopted in Maine
may not at

seem'~at

right-wr~ng

all different from the previous simple

testa yet there is a very important difference

between the two.

Under the simple right-wrong test the

requirement is that the accused must show that he does not
know the difference between right and wrong or to put it
another way, that he is (and presumably was) unable to
distinguish between the two in a general sense.

The modified

right-wrong test asks whether the accused knew the difference
between right and wrong at the time he was alleged to have
committed the wrongful act and with particular reference
to that act.

In other words, did the accused know when he

committed the act that it was wrong?

Thus the change from

the simple to the modified right-wrong test was a change
from a general inquiry into the general mental condition of
the accused to a specific inquiry into the speoific mental
state at a particular time.

16.

The next important revisions-·to the commitment statutes
were adopted in 1880.

The trend

contln~ed

towards the exclu

sion of the mentally retarded (idiotic) from the civil com
mitment process.

The superintendent was to report to the

trustees the names of any patients whom he felt were idiotic
at the time of commitment ()6. p. 986).

The trustees were

to release such persons if in their opinion there was no
danger to the
p. 986).

sa~ety

of either the person or the public6(J6.

There were now two statutory checks on the civil

commitment of the idiotic.

Apparently the legislature was

not satisfied with the trustees' reporting and visitation process,
because although the procedure itself was not altered, it was
directed that the governor appoint a separate committee to
visit the hospital regularly without notice and report on
abuses or ill treatment of inmates ()6, p. 991).

For the

first time the legislature saw fit to deal with the area of
patients' rights, evidencing a further concern over activities
within the hospital walls.

Inmates were to be supplied with

writing materials and free postage so they could write
Whomever they desired, and it was specifically provided
than no officer of the hospital could read or tamper with the
mail of any patient ()6. p. 992).
That the legislature considered a special statute nec
essary to guarantee to mental patients one of the rights
guaranteed to other persons

(i~e.

the right to read one's
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own mail) is revealing about the drastic nature of the commit
ment process.

The first part of the provision, to supply

patients with writing materials and postage, is perhaps even
mor.e revealing.

The comitted person not only had no control

over his possessions which were administered by a court
appointed guardian. neither did he have any control over
his person.

Once committed unless he had the means to com

municate with the outside world he could not contact a lawyer
to initiate habeas corpus proceedings, to secure his own
release.

Thus without this provision the person was completely

at the mercy of others and habeas corpus, as well as any
statutory provision for self-initiated release, would have
been meaningless.
Some minor changes were made at this time in statutes
relating to the disposal

o~

insane criminals.

Those eligible

for criminal commitment could now be ordered initially only
to the hospital, but once there, if deemed by the superin
tendent to be incurable and a bad influence on the other
hospital patients, they could be removed to the state prison

()6, p. 955).

There can be no claims that this was anything

but preventive detention.

A somewhat macabre provision

was also made which stated that a person sentenced to death
and then becoming insane could not be executed until restored
to reason ()6, p. 955).
The most important part of the 1880 revision involved
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an evidenciary regulation on commitment proceedings.

It was

required that the testimony of at least two "respectable"
physicians was necessary to establish the fact of insanity
in all initial commitment proceedings(36. p. 991).

Further

more, their testimony had to be based upon a personal examina
tion and they had to provide written certification to accompany
the person when committed to the hospital (36, p. 991).

Thus

the legislature sought to insure that a commitment order was
based upon

"expert~

medical evidence in order to insure

against abuse of the commitment process by the certifying
officers.

Such an abuse would thereafter require the col

laboration of at least two doctors.
One point should be clarified at this point.

Between

1840 when the insane hospital first opened and 1880, its
size had not remained constant.

The capacity had. through

additions, more than tripled from one hundred to 350 by this
time and even this capacity was inadequate since there were
404 patients in the hospital (J2, p. 2).

Thus procedures

such as the one above to require medical certification before
commitment, were probably designed to keep the hospital from
overcrowding as well as to prevent against injustices.

An

attempt to alleviate this overcrowding was made with the
opening of the Bangor hospital for the insane in 1901.
After 1880 there followed a long period of inactivity
with regard to changes in the commitment laws.

The Revised
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sta.tute'_'of 1904 contained the same civil and criminal commi t
ment procedures. and hospital regulations.

One additional

provision had been made during this period which seems to
recognize hospitalization as a form of punishment.

Previously,

inmates of state prisons could be sent to the insane hospital
if found to be insane but the period of time during which
they were at the hospital would not count toward their prison
sentence.

It was provided at this time however. that those

hospitalized in this manner had to be released at the expira
tion of their sentence whether still considered insane or
not ()7, p.978).

In other words the time spent in the hospital

did count toward the prison sentence.

However this did not

preclude the superintendent of the hospital from initiating
civil commitment proceedings which would, if finalized,
authorize further detention.
In 1916, perhaps spurred by developments in the field of
psychology such as the theoretical formulations of Freud, some
revisions were made in the commitment statutes.

In 1907 the

legislature which had been exclUding the mentally retarded
from the insane hospitals, authorized the construction of
a separate facility to care for these people at Pownal to be
called the

~mine

School for the Feeble Minded ()8, p. 1629).

In 1909 the new facility opened and the statutes enabled the
trustees to transfer a patient between the two insane hospitals
or between a hospital and the school for the feeble minded,

20.

once he was committed to any of them (38, p. 1619).

It

seems likely that those persons who were believed capable of
being helped were sent to the hospital whereas those considered
beyond help went to Pownal.

The purpose of the school for

the feeble minded was to provice care and education to idiotic
males between the ages of six and forty and females between the
ages of six and forty-five except that "paupers" of either
sex could be admitted after these ages (38, p. 1629).

The

on

power to commitAoriginal jurisdiction was given to the judge
of probate.

A hearing was to be held preceded-: by due notice

to all the parties including the person in question (J8. p.1629).
This was the first time in any commitment proceedings that
specific provision was made to allow the person who was the
subject of the proceedings to attend.

Certification was

required from two physicians, who had to be graduates of an
organized medical college and residents of the state for
three years, stating that the person was "a proper subject
for said institution" (38, p. 1629).

However before commit

ment could be ordered approval was necessary for admittance
from the superintendent of the Pownal facility.

The legisla

ture established a set order for admittance with poor people
who had already been in state institutions given first
priority and those who could afford to pay for their own
support were to be admitted only if there was room (38,
p. 1629).

The order for commitment was subject to appeal in
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the normal judicial manner giving the person the priviledge
of taking the case to the highest levels on appeal if unsat
isfiAd.

Although not stated in detail, a provision was made

for release giving the

trus~ees

or a justice of the Supreme

Judicial Court the power to discharge a person "whenever a
further detention in such school in their opinion is unneces
sary" (38, p. 1629).
The procedures for civil commitment to the insane hospitals
also changed at this time but they remained somewhat different
from the procedures for commitment to the school for the
feeble minded.

The municipal officers of the towm wherein

the person resided still had original jurisdiction over the
process of commitment to the insane hospitals according to
the same procedures as before.

However the judge of probate

was also given the power to commit.

Upon complaint from a

relative together with a certificate from one physician
stating the person was insane a hearing would be held. due
notice of which had to be given to the person subject to the
order of commitment (38. p. 1622).

However this procedure

could be undertaken only after the mUnicipal officers of the
town had specifically refused to act on the case and thus
it was not an appeal process.

Appeals from decisions of

the municipal officers in regard to commitment were still to
be directed to two justices of the peace according to the
previous procedure.

The legislature continued to regard the
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process of civil commitment to the insane hospital as essential
ly a non-judicial matter to be decided upon by the people of
a town through their municipal officers.

However judicial

remedies were available if a party was unsatisfied.

A new

procedure for temporary release was also introduced at this
time.

The superintendent could permit an inmate to leave the

hospital for up to six months. receiving him back any time
during this period without a further order for commitment
()8. p. 1625).

No guidelines were given for the superinten

dent to follow, leaving implementation of this statute at
his discretion.

Nevertheless he was indirectly cautioned

against too much use by the provision that the state was
liable for the actions of those temporarily released in this
manner in the same way as if they had remained continuously
in the hospital ()8, p. 1625).
With regard to the criminally insane. the statutes of

1916 provided that an insane criminal in a prison could no
longer be transferred to the insane hospital at the dis
cretion of the warden.

An

examination by a doctor was re

quired and a specific order for commitment was required from
a jUdge of a local municipal court after a hearing on the
matter ()8, p. 15'9).

Authorization . was given for a separate

facility at the Augusta hospital to house the criminally
insane (38. p. 1581).

The superintendent of the hospital

could however move patients between the building for the
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criminally insane and the regular hospital as the safety of
the patients required it in his judgement (38, p. 1581).
An important and extensive revision of the statutes
relating to commitment occurred in 1930.

Many of the new

statutes reflect a desire to open up the commitment process
allowing admittance without the need to go through the lengthy
procedures which necessitate hearings before judicial or
municipal bodies.

A provision was made for the emergency

hospitalization of those in need of immediate "detention
or restraint for his safety or comfort" (39. p. 1723).
Pending the determination of the issue of insanity in the
normal manner by the municipal officers, the superintendent
of the hospital was authorized to detain such people if
accompanied by the original complaint (to the municipal
officers) and a physician's certificate (39, p. 1723).
Commitment in this manner was valid for only ten days and
detention was to cease if the municipal officers did not
formalize the commitment within this time period (39, p. 1723).
For the first time a provision was made in the statutes for
voluntary admission to the insane hospital.

The superinten

dent could accept applications for admission from those
desiring it if in his judgement the person making application
waB sufficiently competent to make it (39, p. 1731).

Although

it may seem paradoxical to say that a person would only be
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admitted upon application if he was sUfficiently sane to make
a competent application, there is a reason for this.

Those

admitted voluntarily were permitted to leave the hospital
when they chose to (39, p. 1731).

Thu8 the desire was to

assure that the most deranged people be committed in the
normal manner 80 that they could be detained and unable to
leave at will.
The standard procedure for commitment to the insane
hospital was modified at this time also.

In lieu of certifica

tion by two physicians as a prerequisite for a formal commit
ment order, a person could be committed to the hospital by a
judge or municipal officer under such limitations as the
officer might direct for the purpose of a determination of
his insanity (39, p. 1731).

Thus under this statute a

person could be detained to determine whether he should be
committed.

Power to commit for short periods

.is~als6



extended to physicians, members of the board of health, and
police officers (30, p. 1732).

It was the responsibility

of the superintendent, in cases referred in this manner, to
cause these people to be either committed according to the
standard procedure, to become voluntary patients, or to be
released within fifteen days (39, p. 1732).

As a check

against this extension of the power to commit it was provided
that if a person referred in this manner was deemed by the
superintendent of the hospital to be not a suitable subject

for hospitalization, the person referring commitment would
be liable for all reasonable expenses which had been in
curred in the process (39, p. 1731).
The revision of 1930 for the first time dealt with the
regulation of private mental hospitals and authorized commit
ment thereto.

A system of licensing was instituted and

these hospitals had to be visited at least once a year by
an officer of the board of health who was to inspect the
cleanliness and sanitary conditions of the premises (39, p.
1733).

A person could be committed to a licensed hospital

for a thirty day period by two physicians if they found that
his proper care warranted it and providing that his rela
tives agreed to pay for his support (39. p. 1733).

If the

superintendent felt that detention after the thirty day per
iod was needed, he could apply to the judge of a local mun
icipal court requesting a hearing after which the jUdge
could order the person to be detained until restored of right
mind or until release was requested by those who were paying
for his support (39. p. 1734).
An extremely important provision allowing sterilization
of those committed to public insane hospitals was introduced
in the 1930 revision.

If a physician in charge of a patient

at an insane hospital found that sterilization was needed
"for the prevention or reproduction of feeble-mindedness or
for the therapeutic treatment of

Borne

forms of mental dis
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ease", he was to notify the nearest relative of this person
about his opinion (39, p. 1732-3).

If the person in question

was capable of giving consent, his consent was necessary for
the operation to occur, but if he was not capable of giving
consent, the consent of the nearest relative would be suffi
cient to authorize the operation (39, p. 1733).

The question

of the ability to give consent1was to be determined by a
council composed of two physicians each of whom had to have
practiced in the State of Maine for five years (39, p. 1733).
This provision for sterilization is important because it
further shows the effect of an order for commitment and the
precarious legal status of the mental patient.
In 1944 a review of the statutes of the State of Maine
was made but very few changes were made in the statutes re
lating to the commitment of the insane.

A reorganization of

the statutes placed the commitment provisions under chapter

23 entitled "The Department of Institutional Services".

The

only new provisions gave the department authority to dis
charge anyone from the state hospitals who they felt it best
for and in addition mandated that records kept by the depart
ment not be open for public inspection (40, p. 501).

The

procedures for commitment remained exactly the same as in

1930 except that chapter 155 section 55 of R.S. 1930, which
gave police officers, physicians and members of the board
of health the power to commit, was repealed (3, p. 114-5).
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In 1951 a complete rewriting and revision of the mental
health statutes occurred, repealing all former statutes in
an attempt at consolidation and simplification.

All the

places where the word "insane" had been used in the past
were now changed to read "mentally ill" except in relation
to criminal statutes where the word "insane" continued to be
used (4, pp. 426-435). The standard civil commitment pro
cedure could be initiated by a justice of the peace, police
officer or relative of the person to be committed.

A peti

tion was to be addressed to the -guperintendent of the hos
pital together with certification by one physician claiming
that the person was mentally ill and required confinement
and treatment.

The petition was then sent to a municipal

officer of the town where the person resided, who would in
quire into the matter and then sign the petition if he felt
that confinement and treatment were needed.
would authorize commitment (4, p. 426).

His signature

The period of this

initial commitment was for thirty-five days but a method was
provided to extend this to an indefinite period (4, p. 426).
The superintendent, any justice of the peace or any notary
public could apply during the first twenty-five days of the

initi.al period to the judge of probate requesting that the
person be confined for continued care and treatment (4, p.

427).

A hearing was held (although the person in question

did not have to be notified of the hearing) and the jUdge
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after hearing all relevant testimony could order indefinite
commitment if "his safety or that of the public will there
by be promoted" (4. p. 427-8).

The judge of probate could

likewise decide to commit indefinitely in the same manner
as above on a direct petition in the first instance from a
blood relative of the person to be committed (4, p. 428).
In this case however. the person had to be properly noti
fied of the hearing to take place (4, p. 428).
The intention of these new procedures seems to be to
keep simple cases involving short periods of commitment out
of the courts.

However there was a realization at the same

time that the permanent,or at least indefinite commitment
period, was something more serious in nature which required
a judicial determination.

Criminal penalties were to be

imposed on anyone who gave false testimony at one of the
hearings or who conspired to have someone not mentally ill
committed (4, p. 429).

Again a provision for voluntary

patients to be admitted to the hospital was instituted, al
though these persons were there voluntarily in name only.
A person would be admitted to the hospital on his own appli
cation. however he had to give ten days notice in writing
before he would be allowed to leave (4. p. 429).

In addi

tion the superintendent was authorized to detain the person
beyond the ten day notice period if he felt that the person
could not be freed with safety to himself and others. while

civil commitment proceedings

were initiated (4, p. 429).

Thus voluntary patients were not much better off in terms
of their freedom than were civilly committed patients.
The statutes in the area of criminal commitment were
also rewritten and revised at this time.

The courts were

no longer required to automatically commit those found not
guilty after raising the defense of insanity, but they could
order such persons either committed indefinitely or released,
(4, p. 31).

Once a person had been so committed however,

the superintendent could not release him (as he was speci
fically authorized to do in all other cases) without a court
order "after satisfactory proof that his discharge would not
endanger the peace and safety of the community" (4, p. 431).
Once again a person could be committed for thirty days to
determine his sanity when the court found that the person
would plead insanity as a criminal defense.

If found by the

hospital to be not insane the person would be ordered back
to jail to await trial, but, if found by the hospital to be
insane,ohe would remain detained therein for continued obser
vation (4, p. 430).

No time limit was placed on the duration

of such commitment, and indeed persons confined in such man
ner would have never had the issue of their insanity and
need for confinement judicially determined in one way or the
other.

Thus in theory they could remain in the hospital for

the rest of their lives merely for "observation" to determine
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their competence to stand trial.
In 1952 in the case of "Appeal of Sleeper in Re Commit
ment of Ralph S. Small to Augusta State Hospital", the Sup
reme Court of Probate handed down an extremely important
decision in regard to the statutory history of commitment in
the state of

~mine.

co..

e..

This was apparently the firstAat this

level to raise questions about the legality of the commit
ment process that did not have financial considerations as its
ulterior motive.

In addition, this case was important because

it reviewed the statutes on the books and provided guidelines
for commitment procedures to be followed by legislatures in
the future.

The decision struck down the entire section of

the 1951 revision discussed above, ruling that adequate safe
guards to protect the constitutional rights of the person to
be committed were not provided for (11, p.)15).

The court

reasoned that the regular commitment procedures, as estab
lished in the 1951 revision, applied indiscriminately to all
persons alleged to be mentally ill whether or not they actually
required detention for their own safety or the safety of others,
and whether or not they had sufficient capacity to under
stand the meaning of a notice of commitment proceedings even
if one were served upon them (11, p. 307).

The court stated.

Under this act a person may be committed for observation
and treatment for a preliminary period of not exceeding
thirty-five days without hearing, without notice, with
out any opportunity to be heard and without any provision
being made in the act allowing him within said period
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to institute any proceedings to test the necessity of
his commitment for observation and treatment. (11. p. J07)
It was recognized by the court however. that there were in
stances where emergency hospitalization of a person pending
a determination of his ultimate commitment to a hospital for
the mentally ill. was needed.

Thus the court ruled that the

emergency hospitalization statute as written in 1930 and left
virtually unchanged in the 1944 revision. adequately provided
detainment ancillary to a proceeding to determine
commitment (11. p. 305).

final

Although the emergency hospitali

zation provision was only a part of the 195yiaw , the court
struck down the entire law because it saw the emergency hos
pitalization provision to be the major thrust of the entire
law.

In addition the court apparently wanted the legislature

to reconsider the entire area and come up with some better
solutions than were posed in the 1951 revision.

But for the

time being. commitment proceedings would be governed by the
statutes written thirty years earlier.

The conclusion of the

court in this case was a far reaching one, which extended to
its extreme, is used by many today as an argument to abolish
the act of involuntary commitment entirely_

"The confine

ment of one who is mentally ill in a mental hospital is a
deprivation of his liberty within the meaning of the four
teenth amendment to the Constitution unless accomplished and
continued with his voluntary consent

ll

(11. p. 313).

gument will be dealt with in more detail later.

This ar

32.

In 1949 the National Institute of Mental Health to
gether with the Federal Security Agency began work on a pro
ject whose purpose was to study the commitment statutes of
the various states and to formulate a standard set of proce
dures to govern the hospitalization of the mentally ill (9,
p. 455).

It was hoped that a commision of this nature could

study all aspects of the problem in more detail and could
thus come up with an act which would be acceptable to all
states giving one standard in the country instead of the vast
ly different procedures from state to state then in effect.
In 1952 as a result of thi~ffort, the "Draft Act Governing
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill" was published (see appen
dix).

The Draft Act was slow to gain acceptance at first

but in 1961 the Maine legislature considered it in an effort
to find a more up to date acceptable set of statutes in this
area than the voided 1951 attempt.

Although Maine made many

changes in the Act (as had other states, defeating one of the
purposes of the Act), the 1961 revision of the commitment
procedures was based heavily both in language and substance
on the original version of the Draft Act.

Since the 1961 a

doption of this revised version forms the basis of the com
mitment procedures in effect today, it will be dealt with in
considerable detail.
The first issue dealt with in the 1961 revision in
volved a definition of terms to be used in the act. the most
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important of which defined a mentally ill individual as some
one "having a psychiatric or other disease which substan
tially impairs his mental health" (5, p. 345).

Voluntary

admission to a public mental hospital was to be granted by
the superintendent to anyone applying therefor who showed
symptoms of mental illness, except for persons with crimin
al actions pending (5, P' 345).

A voluntary patient was to

be released immediately upon request except that release
could be postponed for up to ten days while civil commitment
proceedings were instituted if the release would be unsafe
for the patient of others, in the judgement of the superin
tendent (5, p. 346).

Thus again voluntary patients are

subject to detention with no judicial order or hearing.

That

judicial proceedings could not be instituted against volun
tary patients unless',release had been requested, may have
made some patients reluctant to ask for release.

They might

fear that they would be detained and then committed indefin
itely if they were not completely well at the time of asking
for release (48, p. 277).
There were three procedures for involuntary commitment
provided for under the Maine version of the Draft Act.
procedures werer

!he

1) medical certification, standard non

judicial procedure I 2) medical certification, emergency pro
cedurel and 3} court ordera(5, p. 346).

The medical certi

fication procedure could be initiated by a friend, relative
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o,r guardian of a person.

The person would be committed to

the hospital if two licensed physicians eertified that they
had examined the individual and found him to be mentally
ill and either likely to injure others if not aetained or
in need of care and treatment and unable to make application
for voluntary commitment (5, p. 347).

The emergency procedure

could be initiated by any police or health officer and re
quired certification from one physician that the person was
mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others if not
immediately detained for commitment to occur (5, p. 347).
People committed in either of the two above ways had to be
examined within three days after being admitted by a physician
on the hospital staff. and if he was not examined or if the
physician could not certify that the person was likely to
cause injury if released, he would be immediately discharged

(5, p. 350).

In addition any person so committed would be

released within ten days after a request in writing to the
superintendent (5. p. 351).

Notice however that these

persons could be detained against their will in some cases,
with only a finding by a physician that they need care and
treatment and without a hearing.

(This would seem to be

contrary to the dictates of the court in the Appeal of Sleeperl
but as will be shown later, the Supreme Judicial Court up
held these provisions.)
The third means of commitment in the 1961 act as indicated
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above was the standard judicial procedure by court order.

The

procedure as specified by the legislature is extremely de
tailed as had never before been the case:

The proceedings

commenced, like many others, with a written application to
the probate court from a friend, relativ.e, spouse or guardian
together with certification from one physician that the
person has refused to be examined (5. p. 348).

Notice was

then to be given to the person in question as well as his
parents, spouse and closest other relative or friend.

However

notice to the proposed patient could be omitted if the court
believed that it would be injurious to him (5, p. )48).

The

court WQuld then appoint two licensed physicians to examine
the person at his home or other suitable place and to report
back to the court about his or her mental condition and
suitability for hospitalization (5. p. 348).

Depending upon

the findings of the physicians, the judge could either order
the hearing to take place or terminate any further action in
the case.

The hearing was to take place in an informal

manner and could be held in public at the request of the
proposed patient (5. p. )48).

The court would hear any

testimony at its discretion and witnesses could be cross
examined.

An important provision gave the proposed patient

an opportunity to be represented by legal counsel at the
hearing and if he did not have one of his own, the court
would provide one for him (5. p. )48).

If after the hearing
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of all evidence. the court found that the person was mentally
ill and was likely to injure himself or others if ·not de
tained, or needed care and treatment but could not make
responsible application thereforr it could order his hospital
ization for an indefinite period (5, p. 348).

Any patient

committe~n this manner could apply to the probate court for
a re-hearing which would be conducted in the same manner as
above.

However he had to wait six months for the first re

hearing and one year for each subsequent one (5. p. 351).
There was no provision for appeal of the commitment order to
a higher court or to any other body.
The 1961 revision, again based on the Draft Act, did not
stop at providing procedures for commitment but went into
detail on post admission provisions as had never before been
done.

The superintendent was directed to inquire into the

case of each patient at least once a year to determine whether
continued detention was necessary and if it was not, to
discharge the patient (5, p. 351):

In addition he could re

lease a patient on convalescent status subject to conditions
such as a plan of treatment on an .-.outpatient basis if this
was indicated.

Patients on convalescent status could be

ordered readmitted at any time by the superintendent without
further jUdicial order. and endorsement of such an order by
a municipal jUdge. would authorize the use of police officers
to take the person into custody and convey him to the hospital

37.

(5. P' 351).

Patients were given a number of rights which

had not previously been guaranteed by statute.

The benefits

of the writ of habeas corpus were to be afforded to all
patients guaranteeing its availability in addition to statutory
release procedure (5, P' 352).

Patients were given the

right to humane care and treatment according to the "highest
standards" and no mechanical restraint could be used on any
patient unless required by his medical needs (5, p. 352).
He was given the right to communicate by sealed envelope
with whomever he chose and could be visited by his lawyer or
clergyman at any time (5. p. 352).

It is unclear what other

rights mental patients may have had under this act, but the
specification of these particular rights seems to imply that
others could be taken away.
Before this 1961 revision was passed by the legislature,
questions were put to Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court
of the State of Maine concerning the constitutionality of
certain provisions of the act.

Basically the legislature

wished to know whether the objections that had been raised
to the 1951 laws could be raised under the

n~w

provisions.

The court answered affirmatively to questions raised as to
whether the provisions for involuntary commitment adequately
protected the constitutional rights of the proposed patient

(27. p. 209).

Thus the state's highest court specifically

approved of the act and affirmed the legality of the comrnit
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ment process.
In 1961 changes were also made in the statutes relating
to the area of criminal commitment.

A judge was still able

to commit a person who he learned would plead insanity to
a criminal charge before him. but there was no longer any
proviBion,~or~the

period of detention.

Neither was there

even any provision that the hospital need report back to the
judge on the condition of the person.

Presumably. however,

the Superintendent would inquire into the case of such persons
as was his annual duty for all patients.

But since the

person was merely there for observation at the request of the
court, the euperintendent could not release such a person
without a specific order to that effect from the court. An
other change made at this time such that once again commit
ment became automatic after an acquittal under the defense of
insanity in criminal trials (5, p. 364),

Commitment in this

instance could be ordered to either of the institutions for
the mentally ill or to the Pineland hospital (as the Maine
School for the Feeble Minded had been earlier renamed) but
again discharge could result only from a court order upon
satisfactory proof that release would not endanger the peace
and safety of the public.
The most important change in the criminal commitment
statutes made in 1961 and indeed one of the most interesting
and far-reaching statutory changes ever, came with the adoption
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of a new teat to be used to determine tha question of criminal
responsibility under an insanity defense.

With the adoption

of this new test Maine abandoned the old M'Naghten rule
which had been in effect for over ninety years.

The writing

of this new test in the statutes was in itself a major change
because in most jurisdictions and up till then in Maine, the
formulation of such tests was left to the courts and not
prescribed by statute.

The wording of the new test, was

based upon a controversial decision by the United states third
District court in the case of "Durham VB. The United States",
which has come to be known as the Durham Rule (16, p. 862).
The Maine version of the Durham rule states "An accused is
not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product
of mental disease or defect.

The terms 'mental disease' or

'mental defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only
by repeated criminal conduct or excessive use of drugs or
alcohol"(5, p. 364).
Maine was only the fourth jurisdiction (along with the
District of Columbia, the Virgin llsands, and New Hampshire)
to adopt a Durham type formulation, but was also the last.
Basically this test was designed to open the defense of insani
ty to more people than did the cognitively oriented M'Naghten
rule.

Since anyone whose criminal act was the product of any

mental disease, would be acquitted under the Durham rule, it
is easy to see why the legislature made sure that all those
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so acquitted would be automatically incarcerated.

The courts

accepted the use of the Durham rule as the basis to determine
criminal responsibility in 196) in the case of state vs. Parks

(46. p. 328).

Some of the implications of the Durham rule

will be discussed later.
In 1963 the procedures for commitment to the Pineland
Hospital and Training Center were revised to bring them into
line with the civil commitment procedures, but there are
some noticeable difrerences between the two.
admission procedures could be initiated by-'a

Voluntary
patent~

relative.

spouse or guardian but they could not be initiated by someone
on his own behalf (6, p. 454).

Thus it was voluntary only

to the person making the application, not to the person to
be committed.

Emergency commitment was provided for upon

request from a licensed physician with approval from a relative
or guardian, for a period of fifteen days.

If continued

confinement was indicated, procedures for voluntary commit
ment without certification wef,e to be initiated (6, p. 456).
A person admitted under either of the two above procedures
would be released within ten days after it was requested by
the person's parent or guardian, tiut again the person could
not request his own release (6. p. 456).

The procedures for

court ordered commitment to the Pineland hospital were iden
tical to the procedures for commitment to state hospitals
for the mentally ill outlined above.

However in order to
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commit the court need not find that the person was dangerous
in any way but that he was "mentally retarded ••• and because
of his retardation •.• ls in need of education, training,
~reatment.

or care at the Pineland Hospital" (6, p. 455).

There was no detailing of patients' rights as was done for
patients in hospitals for the mentally ill, with the sole
exception of the right to Habeas Corpus being guaranteed to
all patients.
Between 1963 and the present there have not been many
substantial Qhanges made in the commitment statutes.

In 1965

a procedure for informal admission to the hospitals for the
mentally ill was added, repealing the voluntary admisssion
procedures.

Any person applying for admission would be

granted it if the superintendent

fel~

such a person was a

suitable subject for hospitalization (7, p. 12).

Importantly,

the person was free to leave at any time without notice and it
became the responsibility of the superintendent to inform
the patient of that right (7, p. 12).

The P,prisollBr" status

of a person committed through acquittal after a defense of
insanity was

reinforce~.

It was provided that those so commit

ted could be released by the superintendent but their actions
were to be governed by the state Probation and Parole Board
(7, p. 638).

In 197) the standard to be applied to determine whether
commitment would be needed was changed.

The old formulation
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it will be remembered, asked whether the person was likely
to injure himself or others if not detained or was in need of
care or treatment and could not make responsible application
therefor.

The new standard provided that the person could

be committed if the court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the person "poses a likelihood of serious harm"
(8, p. 969).

It should be kept in mind that only this stan

dard was changed, but the procedures remained basically intact.
Likelihood of serious harm was defined to mean.
A. risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested
by evidence of homicidal or other violent behavior or
evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear
of violent behavior and serious physical harm to
them, or
B.

risk of physical harm to the person himself as
manifested by evidence of attempts at or threats of
suicide or serious bodily harmr or

C.

reasonable certainty that serious impairment or
injury will result to the person alleged to be
mentally ill as manifested by his inability to
avoid or protect himself from such impairment or
injury and suitable community resources for his
care are unavailable (8, p. 969).

Also in 1973 an important restriction was made upon the
len~th

of time for which commitment could be ordered by the

court in civil cases.

First of all the court was to consider

all alternatives to commitment including outpatient care or
anything else suitable.

If commitment was indicated as a

last resort the order in the first instance would only be
good for four months (8, p. 971).

Each subsequent rehearing

could be followed by a commitment order good for one year
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(8, p. 971).

The final change of subsistance in the commit

ment process that has been made to date occurred in 1974.

In

all instances where certification was needed from a licensed
physician. certification could also be made by a psychologist
licensed to practice clinical psychology (29. p. 94).
At the present time there is a major piece of legisla
tion before the Maine legislature dealing with the area of
criminal commitment in the form of a new test to determine
criminal responsibility under the insanity defense.

This

proposal, a part of the new Maine Criminal Code. seeks the
adoption of the Model Penal Code or Americal Law Institute
(ALI) rule.

The rule states.

1.

A person is not responsible for criminal conduct
if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminalit~
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.

2.

As used in this section "mental disease or defect"
means any abnormal condition of the mind regard
less of its medical label, which SUbstantially
affects mental or emotional processes and
SUbstantially impairs the processes and capacity
of a person to control his actions.

J.

The defendant shall have the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that he lacks
criminal responsibility as described in subsection
1.(10, p. A-20).

This rule was originally written in 1955 by the
American Law Institute in an effort to provide a uniform
standard across the country in much the same way that
the National Institute of Mental Health did in its Draft
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Act for civil commitment.

It has aroused a good deal of

controversy but, although slowly at
acceptance in the

cour~s.

firs~,

it has gained wide

Tn 1972, the Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia which had originally devised the
Durham rule, abandoned it and adopted the ALI rule (49. p. 969).
This fact is used by the proponents of the rule's adoption in
Maine as evidence on its behalf.

Maine thus faces the problem

of whether to keep the Durham rule or adopt the ALI rulel a
problem that shall be examined in detail since it Sheds light
on the criminal' commitment area.
The

pu~po8e

behind the formulation of the Durham rule. as

mentioned earlier, was to open the defense of insanity up to
more defendants than were able to use it under the M'Naghten
rule.

All that is necessary under the Durham rule for the

jury to find a defendant who has pleaded insanity "not guilty"
is for them to find that the person's wrongful act was the
product of a mental disease or defect.

Any evidence as to

the person' B mental state at the time of commi ttingthe:.:ci-tme
may be intDoduced and thus the issue of criminal responsibility
is not left to rest upon any particular (cognitive or emotional)
symptom.

But it is precisely this broad nature of the Durham

rule that has accounted for its criticism.

Originally it was

felt that many defendants would use the insanity defense as an
escape from criminal responsibility but this criticism has not
proved valid since no evidence has been found of an increase

in the number of persons invoking the defense in jurisdictions
under the Durham rule.

Another criticism is the use of the

word "product" without clarification.

It is somewhat ambiguous

and difficult to prove whether an aet occurred as a product of
the mental disease or merely occurred in addition to it.

It

must be clearly shown that the act was a direct result or the
mental disease or there is criminal liability.

At the very

time that the Durham rule was being introduced in Maine the
concept of "mental disease",oupon which the rule so heavily
relied, was coming under attack.

Led by Thomas Szasz, critics

claim that "mental disease ••. has outlived Whatever cognitive
usefulness it might have had and it now functions as a myth"
(47. p. 12).

A major criticism of the Durham rule is that it has
shifted the burden of determining criminal responsibility
from the legal to the medical establishment.

The jury does not

have the latitude under the Durham rule to determine the issue
of responsibility that it has under other tests.

Testimony

by medical experts as to a person's mental state is no longer
merely evidenclary but it is conclusive.

If for example a

psychiatrist testifies that a defendant is suffering from
"schizophrenia~

the inquiry becomes nothing more than a battle

between experts to determine whether the person was indeed
suffering from this disease.

The jury need make no conclusions

about the person's mental state other than which expert was
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correct.

Thus the verdict of the jury is not a judgement by

"peers" but is instead a judgement made by medical experts
and reiterated by the jury.

The problem in this regard is

dramatically highlighted by the "weekend flip-flop case" (22,
p. 18).

The petitioner was described as a sociopath, and a

psychiatrist from St.

Elizabeth~s

Hospital in Washington

stated that a person with a sociopathic personality was not
suffering from a mental disease.

That was Friday afternoon.

On Monday morning through a policy change at

st.

Eliza~eth's

Hospital it was determined as an administrativ.e matter that
the state of a sociopathic personality did constitute a mental
disease (22, p. 18).
Perhaps the most valid criticism of the Durham rule is
that it does not adequately deal with the question of criminal
intent.

The logic behind the laws' acceptance of mental in

capacity as a defense to crime is based on the fact that a
crime consists of both a wrongful act and a wrongful intent

(44, p. 107).

Thus a person who is acquitted of a crime

under a defense of insanity, is considered to have not had
the requisite criminal intent or mens rea because of his
mental condition.

But

th~

Durham rule could be interpreted

to infer that any person with any mental disease or defect
could not be capable of intending to commit a crime.

It

seems clear that some persons who are suffering from a mental
disease or defect could intend to do wrong in some situations
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and if they did intend to do wrong there is no reason why
they should not be held responsible for their actions.
The ALI rule eliminates many of the problems that have
arisen under the Durham rule.

It is not as general as the

Durham rule and it gives to the jury some latitude to consider
medical testimony while at the same time imposing its own
judgements based on that testimony.

The wording of the ALI

rule, although based on a synthesis of the M'Naghten rule
and the Irresistible Impulse rule, is modernized and does
not generate many of the criticisms either of these rules did.
It substitutes "appreciate" for "know" bringing in the emotional
as well as cognitive aspects of criminal intent.

It uses

the word "conform" instead of "control" in bringing in the
voluntary component while staying away from the misleading
words "irresistible impulse".

However the ALI rule continues

to cling to the mental disease concept which as has been
pointed out, causes some problem.
It appears uncertain

at~this

time whether this provision

of the proposed Criminal Code will pass or not.

The opposi

tion comes largely from the Maine Psychiatric Association.
This is understandable since under the Durham rule psychi
atrists have a greater voice in the determination of criminal
liability.

Opposition to this change has also come from civil

liberties groups.

They apparently feel that the ALI rule

is too restrictive and will result in many people going to
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jail who should go to a hospital.

(In this

~nstance

they

forget their own argument used in other instances that there
is not much difference between the two.)

Clearly it will be

difficult to adopt the ALI rule for criminal responsibility
in Maine oV.er

the objections of the psychiatric "experts I.

and the civil libertarians.

There is another change proposed in the new criminal
code effecting the criminal commitment area.

Th~s

involves

the court procedure to be followed when a person enters a plea
of not guilty together with a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity.

Basically this would involve a two part trial with

the issue of guilt and the issue of insanity being separated
and determined in different phases of the trial (10, p. 20).
The first phase would determine only the factual issue of
guilt with evidence of mental disease or defect inadmissable.
If the jury finds the defendant not guilty the proceedings
would terminate at that point; however if they find him
guilty the second phase of the trial would commence (10, p. 20).
During the second phase the jury would hear only evidence of
his mental condition and would apply the prevailing test to
find the defendant either responsible or not guilty by reason
of insanity (10. p. 21).
The purpose for having a trial of this kind, as expressed
by the writers_6f-,·the code, is to give the defendant "the
opportunity to make an insanity defense without thereby
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making the implied admission to the jury that he committed the
act charged against him" (10, p. 21).

This was the case under

the standard trial procedure in which the defendant pleading
insanity usually conceded the fact that he committed the act
and concentrated on proving his insanity.

However the defen

dant does not have to concede committing the act.

He could

at the same time provide evidence to show that both: the act
was not committed by him and that by reason of mental incapacity
he could not have the requisite intent.

It is important to

remember however that a crime is composed of two elements, a
wrongful act and a wrongful intent.

Each element is neces

sary but neither is sufficient for there to be criminal res
ponsibility.

In the two part trial formulation however, a

crime is in effect treated as being composed of only one
element, the wrongful act.

After it is determined whether the

defendant is guilty or not, then the issue of his insanity is
decided.

By separating these two issues, insanity no longer

is a defense to crime but is instead an excuse.

The verdict

of not guilty by reason of insanity is, after a verdict of
guilty in the first phase of the trial, more like the Scotch
verdict of "guilty but insane" (20, p. 540).

Thus insanity

becomes a defense in name only.
Although I know of no serious objections that have been
raised to this part of the proposed Criminal Code by any
groups, careful study by the legislature should result in its
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rejection.

Should it pass however, it probably could not

stand up in the courts.

A similar provision for a two part

trial was struck down in Arizona, although one was upheld

in Wisconsin.

In making a proposal for a two part trial of

this kind, the legislature seems to be tackling (although
unintentionally) a much larger problem of whether to abolish
the insanity defense altogether.

This ShO~d not be undertaken

without very careful studY1 and even if it were decided to
do away with the defense, at least two courts have ruled that
this would be unconstitutional on "due process" grounds (10,
p. 20).

It appears that the insanity defense is "so integral

a part of the criminal process that a person may not be
convicted without invoking its benefits" (10, p. 20).
Probably the most important aspect of the criminal commit
ment area is not dealt with in either the proposed Criminal
Code or in other pending legislation.

This is the provision

for automatic commitment after a person is acquitted under
the defense of insanity.

There will have to be a review of

this provision and subsequent release procedures in the near
future because different tests for insanity are relatively
meaningless compared to it.

In practice, the particular test

that is applied may not make much difference to a jury of
twelve average people who most probably have an idea of whether
the person is insane or not irregardless of the instructions
given to them (18, p. 1448).

However the provision for
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mandatory commitment is important because it dictates whether
a person acquitted under the insanity defense will be incar
cerated or set free.
I

Indeed if the jury is aware of such a

provision their decision of guilty or not guilty by reason of
insanity becomes a choice of "whether to send the poor devil
to the jug or the loony bin" (26, p. 211).

If the jury is

unaware of such a provision they may be reluctant to acquit
for fear of turning loose a -"dangel'oUS criminal".
The practice of summary commitment after acquittal under
a defense of insanity seems to be a violation of the "due
process" clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitu
tion of the United States.

Section one of the fourteenth

amendment states in part.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the priviledges or immUnities of citizens
of the United States, nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
When a defendant pleads insanity to a criminal charge he is
alleging that at the time the wrongful act was committed he
could or did not have the requisite criminal intent.

With

the present backlog in criminal cases before most courts, the
trial may very well take place years after the act took place.
Thus the determination of insanity in a criminal trial relates
to a specific act that may have oocured years before.

In

addition, in order to stand trial the defendant has to be
found competent to understand the charges agaist him and to
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participate in his
stand trial.

de~ense.

Thus he is "sane" enough to

In no way is the verdict not guilty by reason

of insanity a statement on the mental condition of the defen
dant at the time the verdict is given, yet automatic commit
ment follows such a verdict.

To commit someone in this manner

without a hearing to determine his mental condition at the
time of commitment may be a deprivation of liberty without
due process of law.

This is not to suggest that the person

might not be severely disturbed and in need of treatment. but
to summarily commit such a person without a hearing is serious
indeed.

In rebuttal to this argument, however, it has been

suggested by a noted expert in this area that "since commit
ment via the criminal process is initiated by the defendant,
it is more akin to voluntary than involuntary civil commitment"
(19. p. 2)0).

A serious problem arises, when a person summarily committed
in this manner, is to be released from incarceration.
there is no

~earing

Since

solely to determine the issue of commit

ment, its purposes are not clear.

Is the person committed

because he needs treatment or is he committed because he
poses a potential danger to the community?

In Maine it ap

pears that the person is committed because of his potential
danger since the standard for release specifies that the person
no longer "pose a likelihood of' serious harm" as discussed
previously.

Again, however, no determination was ever made
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in the first place that the person did pose a likelihood of
serious harm.

The power to determine whether a person com

mitted via the criminal route is not potentially dangerous
and Renee can be released. is left to the courts with psychi
atrists as expert witnesses.

Most hospital administrators are

probably happy to leave this determination to the courts
since releasing someone from the hospital whom the courts
have ordered detained places a heavy burden of responsibility
on the releasing officer.
re~ards

However one body of op1nion..

courts as peculiarly ill-suited to judge the readi

ness for release from a hospital of persons committed under
the criminal process (19. p. 227).

The leading exponent of

this position, Dr Thomas Szasz, states the argument in the
following manner a
If a psychiatrist in charge of a patient--who is not
a convicted criminal!--regards him in his own best
jUdgement as ready to leave a hospital, how can he
in his professional conscience let a court tell him
that this he can not do? •..• While the court has the
right to order commitment. once a patient has been
committed he comes under the jurisdiction of the
hospital authorities. Hospital psychiatrists should
be able to release the patient Should they wish to
do so (19. p. 227).
This emphasizes the peculiar legal position of the criminally
committed mental hospital inmate.

On the one hand he has

been acquitted of criminal liability to be treated as a patient
not a prisoner.

But on the other hand he is not in all

respects a patient since he is sUbject to special release
procedures not applicable to other patients.

This ambiguous
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position of the patient committed through the criminal process,
certainly can lead to frustration as he wonders about his
peculiar status.

Such frustration can only be

describ~as

anti-therapeutic making the entire criminal commitment process
worthless.
It should become clear from this discussion of the criminal
commitment process that a complete re-evaluation is needed.
Chan~ing

the particular test of criminal responsibility while

important in itself does not improve the overall situation
when there is a provision for mandatory commitment upon
acquittal.

In addition, clarification of the meaning of the

insanity defense and the legal status of the defendant ac
quitted under the defense is needed for any changes made in
the statutes to be truly effective.

These are questions

which must be considered by the legislature in the future
although it is likely that they will be studied only after
the courts have intervened.
In contrast to the proposed changes in the criminal
commitment statutes that are before the legislature, there
are no substantive changes proposed in the civil commitment
statutes at the present time.

The civil commitment statutes

have come a long way especially with the adoption of the
revised Draft Act and subsequent changes.

The end of civil

commitment for an indefinete period was particularly impor
tant in safeguarding persons against unjust confinement.
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However as with the criminal commitment statutes, there are
some fundamental issues underlying the civil commitment
process which need to be examined preferably before the courts
mandate examination.

Civil commitment is taken for granted,

but the time has come for a complete evaluation of the ethics
and constitutionality of

involuntar~ly

confining someone

because of his mental condition.
In Maine, the present standard for civil commitment
states that to be committed a person must "pose a likelihood
of serious harm" as discussed previously.

Thus commitment

is justified as being for the protection of the person and
the community.

Although the phrase "likelihood of serious

harm" is defined and clarified in great detail, it still is
based on propositions which are scientifically tenuous.
psychiatrists and psychologists are asked to make predictions
about the future behavior of a person which they have no
expertise in doing with any degree of certainty.

"The asses

ment of dangerousness involves sociological rather than primar
ily medical and psychiatric jUdgements"(20, P' 542).
addition,

underlyi~~

In

all this is the belief that people

with some form of mental illness are more dangerous than normal
people when the evidence suggests that this is not the case.
In a study of 684 patients released from mental hospitals in
England, there were no reports of violence over a five year
period (20, p. 540).

Another study showed that the crime
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rate of a sample of mental patients both before and after
commitment is about one fourth of that for the general pop
ulation (51, p. 1289).

other studies in this area have led

to the inescapable conclusion that mental illness is an
especially poor indication of future dangerous conduct (51,
p. 1295).

Even if potential dangerousness could be shown with a
high degree of accuracy, the notion of confining a person
against his will because of such a finding is contrary to
the American notion of liberty as expressed in the law.

If

a sociologist predicted that a person not alleged to be
mentally ill was eighty per cent likely to commit a felony,
no law would permit his confinement (13, p. 1290).

To allow

that a mentally ill person about whom such a prediction has
been! made may be confined, seems to be a violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
If the inteeest which justifies making only the
mentally ill liable to confinement is the need to
protect society, then the classification is both
overinclusive (most mentally ill persons are not
dangerous) and underinclusive (many non-mentally
ill persons are potentially dangerous). This is
a combination of defects to which courts have been
especially hostil~ (51, p. 1294).
The united states Court of Appeals in ordering the release
of a mental patient from St. Elizabeth's Hospital on a habeas
corpus petition ruled that "the courts have no legal basis
of ordering ..• continued confinement on mere apprehension of
future unlawful acts" (19, p. 237).

It is precisely such
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apprehension which permits the commitment of the mentally ill
under the present statutes in Maine.
Committing mentally ill persons because they are dangerous
to others is constitutionally suspect for another reason also.
r~

i

The Supreme Court held in Robinson vs. California that a law
declaring narcotics addiction to be a criminal offense was
unconstitutional because confinement for a condition was
cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution (42. p. 1417).

The

court inferred that civil commitment of the mentally ill would
be constitutional if the purpose was to provide treatment.
But commitment of dangerous persons is a harder case because
the chief purpose of such a measure is to afford protection
for society, not treatment for the patient.

There can be no

question but that the deprivation of a person's liberty
against his will is a form of punishment.

"Incarceration may

not seem like punishment to the jailers but it is punishment
to the jailed" (14 t p. 1101).

The Utah Supreme Court has

ruled in relation to a voluntary mental patient that "a
patient at the hospital is as much confined and has as little
freedom as a mentally alert trustee in a jailor prison" (48,
p. 277).

It thus seems possible that the courts could rule

that commitment under the "likelihood of serious harm" basis
of Maine"s commitment statutes t without a provision for
treatment t is cruel and unusual punishment.
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It may very well be that the courts would not consider
civil commitment in and of itself to be either a violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth ammendment or
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment.
However even if the concept of commitment of the mentally
ill is not unconstitutional, there certainly is no reason why
the procedures leading to comminment can not be carefully
scrutinized and opened to constitutional attack.

In the

Maine version of the Draft Act with subsequent amendments,
the judicial hospitalization procedure is particularly vul
nerable.

The pre-hearing procedures are elaborated in great

detail but the procedures the court is to follow for the
conduct of the hearing are not so detailed.

It is provided

that the hearing be held in an informal manner. and the rules
of evidence need not be applied (5, p. J48).

To be deprived

of his liberty after committing a crime, an accused must be
tried according to strict procedures designed to safeguard
agaist his being unfairly confined.

This is to insure that

the accused is not deprived of his liberty without the "due
process of law" spoken of in the fourteenth amendment.

How

ever these procedural safeguards in the form of evidenciary
rules such as the "hearsay rules", are not provided for persons
being deprived of their liberty in civil commitment hearings.
This informal manner in which the hearings to determine
commitment are held is· ijustified by the framers of the Draft
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Act as insuring that no "important matter be barred on tech
nical grounds" (12, p. 468).

Their intention to "assure

full and fair consideration of all relevant data" (12, p. 467)
is laudable, but the serious nature of the proceedings seems
to have been overlooked.

"Due process" demands that the same

procedural safeguards given to accused criminals before their
liberty be denied them, be extended to proposed mental
patients.
The lack of procedural safeguards along with the other
lapses in constitutional guarantees outlined above are often
justified by the benevolent reason that treatment is being
provided to those who need it and are unable to afford them
selves of it (13. p. 1288).

This argument clouds the issue

by stating a purpose for commitment (the need for treatment)
that was specifically repealed and replaced with the "likeli
hood of serious harm" standard in Maine.

Recently the courts

have begun to look into this area and have recognized the
right to treatment as a key issue in attacks on the commit
ment process, regardless of the statutory purpose for commit
ment.
Early cases to recognize the right to treatment were
based upon statutory interpretations.

These cases were

brought when a person was detained under a statutory provision
that commitment be for the purpose of care and treatment; and
the courts held that such a patient must be confined in a
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setting somewhat more therapeutic than a jail (51, p. 1285).
In Rouse vs Cameron, although again based on a statutory
provision. the court ruled that "when society confines a man
on the asserted ground that he needs treatment, its lofty
purpose can not be forgotten--treatment must be provided"
(41. p. 89).

In Wyatt vs. Stickney the District court of

Alabama ruled that all civilly committed patients were
entitlied to treatment (50. p. 781).

But the important point

of this decision was that it was not based upon a statutory
provision.

All patients regardless of why they were committed

had a constitutional right to receive adequate treatment.

In

addition, a finding of treatability was necessary at the time
the commitment is ordered (51, p. 1291).

The reasoning

behind the court's decision takes into account the lack of
procedural and substantive safeguards in the commitment
process.

The court·s conclusion seems to be that these

possible constitutional violations are allowable if commit
ment can be justified by showing that those committed needed
and were receiving treatment for their disorder.

The effect

of this decision is to make the states stop playing the "pea
and-shell

game with the individual's rights" (51, p. 1289)

by assuring that the benevolent justification, that people

are committed for their own good, is carried out.
A problem area of the Wyatt decision is in defining and
establishing standards as to exactly what constitute~adeqUate
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treatment.

There is some question as to whether this is a

proper jUdicial matter since the evaluation of treatment is
es~~ntially

an area of medical or psychiatric expertise.

It

has been pointed out however that the courts in,for example
malpractice suits, are often called on to resolve conflicts
that result from disagreeing experts (51, p. 1297).

Since

the legislature is the authority which establishes the means
and standards of the commitment process. it seems proper
that they should also establish the standards for adequate
treatment to be enforced by the courts.

What are needed are

not specific therapeutic programs to be decided on by the
legislature, but standards.

In the Wyatt case the aourt man

dated staff to patient ratios for physicians. psychologists,
nurses, social workers, and aides (50, P' 383-384).

It is

these type of guidelines that the legislature should establish.
It would be a mistake for the legislature to try to determine
best or better treatments but they should not accept the
"assertion that simple custody of the mental patient, away
from society and its stresses and free from day to day re
sponsibility is treatment

II

(41, p. 106).

would thus be unacceptable by itself.

Milieu therapy

Judge Bazelon has

proposed as a standard for treatment .. that adequate in light
of present knowledge"r although this is fairly vague (41. p. l04}.
However it has been warned that

~if

too high a standard of

treatment is imposed, less conscientous states may abandon
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all pretense of providing public treatment" (41, p. 112).
Clearly this can be avoided if it is required that each patient
receive an individual program of treatment, and that continued
detention be justified by substantial progress.
It should be evident from this discussion that the
practice of. involuntarily committing the mentally disordered
raises some important questions which

chall~ge

both the

ethics of commitment itself and the procedures through wh&ch
commitment is accomplished.

Some minimal limitations are

suggested from what has been said, which future legislatures
must consider in drawing up legislation in this area.

Pirst

where commitment of the mentally ill is authorized to protect
society from harm, rigid procedures are needed similar to
the safeguards of the criminal process (41, p. 102).

Second

where commitment is justified as being for the person's own
good and constitutional rights might otherwise be violatedl
adequate treatment must be provided (41, p. 102).

But

beyond these minimums there should be an evaluation of whether
there really is a need to detain these people against their
will.

Are mentally disturbed people committed because they

are truly potentially harmful or truly in need of treatmentr
or is it because society does not like them and is uncomfort
by their presence?

Perhaps a society has the right to ostracize

those members whom it feels that way about.

But if that is

the case, society should admit it, and not hide behind a
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a more ego-syntonic benevolent facade.
shoud not be made indirectly.

"It is a decision which

Thorough consideration might

lead the legislature to conclude, as did the board of directors
of the New York Civil Liberties Union, that:
Mental illness can never ..• be a justifiable reason
for depriving a person of his liberty against his
objections. Even when such deprivations are accom
panied by fair procedures, they are unjustified
except on a basis ... that would be equally applicable
in the absence of mental illness (43. p. 126).

APPENDIX

TheNI~lli
-

Draft Act

AN ACT GO'tJERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF
THE MENTALLY ILL

Part !--Definitions
Section 1. Definitions.--As used in this Act, terms shall
have the following meanings.
(a) Mentally ill individual.--An individual having a
psychiatric or other disease which sUbstantially impairs his
mental health.
(b) Patient.--An individual under observation, care, or
treatment on a hospital pursuant to this Act.
(c) Licensed physlcian.--An individual licensed under the
laws of this State to practice medicine and a medical officer
of the Government of the United States while in this state in
the performance of his official duties.
(d) Designated examiner.--A licensed physician registered
by the (central administration) as specially qualified, under
standards established by it, in the diagnos&s of mental or
related illness.
(e> Hospital.--A public or private hospital or institu
tion, or part therof, equipped to provide in-patient care and
treatment for the mentally ill.

Reprinted from Public Health Service Publication No. 51,
United states Government Brinting Office, Washington, 1952.

(f) Head of hospital.--The individual in charge of a
hospital, or his designee.
(g) (Central administration).--The (State) (Department
of Health) (Mental Health Commission) (Department of Mental
Hy~iene).

Part II--Voluntary Hospitalization
Sec. 2.Authority to receive voluntary patients.--The
head of a private hospital may and, the head of a pUblic
hospital, subject (except in case of medical emergency) to the
availability of suitable accommodations. shall admit for ob
servation, diagnosis, care, and treatment any individual who
is mentally ill or has symptoms of mental illness and who,
being 16 years of age or over. applies therefor, and any indi
vidual under 16 years of age who is mentally ill or has symptoms
of mental illness, if his parent or legal guardian applies
therefor in his behalf.
Sec. ).Discharge of voluntary patients.--The head of the
hospital shall discharge any voluntaryQ,patient who has recovered
or whoae hospitalization he determines to be no longer advisable.
He may also discharge any voluntary patient if to do
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would,

in the judgment of the head of the hospital, contribute to the
most effective use of the hospital in the care and treatment
of the mentally ill.
Sec. 4.Right to release on application.--(a) A voluntary
patient who requests his release or whose release is requested,
in

writing~

by his legal guardian.

paren~,

spouse. or adult

next of kin shall be released forthwith exoept that

(1) if the

patien~

was admitted on his own application

and the request for release is made by a person other
than the patient, release may be conditioned upon the
agreement of the patient thereto, and
(2) if the patient, by reason of his age, was admitted on
the application of another person, his release prior
to becoming 16 years of age may be conditioned upon
the consent of his parent or guardian, and

(3) if the head of the hospital, within 48 hours from the
receipt of the request, files with the (probate) court
or a judge thereof, whether in session or in vacation,
a certification that in his opinion the release of the
patient would be unsafe for the patient or others,
release may be postponed on application for as long as
the court or a jUdge thereof determines to be necessary
tor the commencement of proceedings for jUdicial
hoipitalization, but in no event for more than 5 days •.
(b) Notwith standint any other provision of

th~s

Act,

judicial proceedings for hospitalization shall not be commenced
with respect to a voluntary patient unless release of the
patient has been requested by himself of the individual who
applied for his admission.
Part III--Involuntary Hospitalization
Subpart A--Admisslon Provisions
Sec. 5. Authority to receive involuntary patients.--The
head of a private hospital may and the head of a public hospital.
SUbject (except in case of medical emergency) to the availability

of suitable accommodations, shall receive therein for observa
tion, diagnosis, care, and treatment any individual whose
admission is applied for under any of the following prodeduresl
(a)

Hospitalization on medical certification. standard

nonjudicial procedure.
(b) Hospitalization on medical certification. emergency
procedure.
(e)

Hospitalization without endorsement or medical certifi

cationl emergency procedure.
(d) Hospitalization on court ordera judicial procedure.
Sec. 6. Hospitalization on medical certification. standard
nonjudicial procedure.--(a) Any individual may be admitted to a
hospital upon
(1) written application to the hospital by a friend, relative,

spouse, or guardian of the individual, a health officer, or the
head of any institution which such individual may be. and
(2)

certification by two designated examiners that they

have examined the individual and that they
that

are

of the opinion

(A) he is mentally 111, and
(E) because of his illness is likely to injure himself or
others if allowed to remain at liberty, or

(e) is in need of care or treatment in a mental hospital,
and because of his illness, lacks sufficient insight or
capacity to make responsible application therefor.
The certification by the designated examiners may be made
jointly or separately, and may be based on examination conducted
jointly or separately, as the regulations of the (central

administration) may prescribe.

An

individual with respect to

whom such certification has been issued may not be admitted on
the basis thereof at any time after the expiration of 15 days
after the date of examination. exclusive of any period of
temporary detention authorized under section 11.

The head of

the hospital admitting the individual shall forthwith

ma~e

a

report thereof to the (central administration).
(b) Such certification, if it states a belief that the indi
vidual is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to
remain at liberty. shall, upon endorsement for such purpose
by the head of the (local health authority) or by a jUdge of
any court of record of the county in which the individual 1s
resident or present. authorize any health or police officer to
take the individual into custoay and transport him to a hospital
designated in the application.
Sec. 7. Hospitalization on medical certification. emergency
procedure.--(a) Any individual may be admitted to a hospital
upon
(1) written application to the hospital by any health or
police officer or any other person stating his belief
that the individual is likely to cause injury to
himself or others if not immediately restrained. and
the grounds for such belief. and
(2) a certification by at least one licensed physician that
he has examined the individual and is of the opinion
that the individual is mentally ill and, because of
his illness. is likely to injure himself or others if

not immediately restrained.
An

individual with respect to whom such a certificate has been

issued may not be admitted on the basis thereof at any time after
the expiration of 3 days after the date of examination.

The

head of the hospital admitting the individual shall forthwith
make a report thereof to the (central administration).
(b) Such a certificate, upon endorsement for such purpose
by

the head of the (local health authority) or a jUdge of any

court of record of the county in which the individual is
present, shall authorize any health or police officer to take
the individual into custody and transport him to a hospital as
designated in the application.
Sec. 8. Hospitalization without endorsement or medical
certifioation. emergency proeedure.--Any health or police
officer who has reason to believe that
(a) an individual is mentally ill and. because of his illness,
is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at
liberty pending examination and certification by a licensed
physician, or
(b) an individual who has been

~ertifled

under section 6

or 7 as likely to injure himself or others and therefore cannot
be allowed to remain at liberty pending the endorcement of the
certificate as provided in those sections, may take the indivi
dual into custody.

apply'~o

transport him thereto.

a hospital for his admission, and

The application for admission shall

state the circumstances under which the individual was taken
into custody and the reasonscfor the officer's belief.

The

head of the hospital admitting the individual shall forthwith
make a report thereof to the (central administration).
Sec. 9. Hospitalization upon court order, judicial procedure.
(a) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an
individual may be commenced by the filing of a written applica
tion with the (probate) court

b~a

friend, relative, spouse, or

guardian of the individual, or by a licensed physician, a
health or public welfare officer, or the head of any public or
private institution in which such individual may be.

Any such

application shall be accompanied by a certificate of a licensed
physician stating that he has examined the individual and is
of the opinion that he is mentally ill and Should be hospitalized,
or a written statement by the applicant that the individual has
rlfused to submit to examination by a licensed physician.
(b) Upon receipt of an application the court shall give
notice thereof to the proposed patient, to his legal guardian.
if any. and to his spouse, parents, and nearest known other
relative or friend.

If, however, the court has reason to

believe that notice would be likely to be injurious to the
proposed patient, notice to him may be omitted.
(e) The examination shall be held at a hospital or other
medical facility, at the home of the proposed patient, or at
any other suitable place not likely to have a harmful effect
on his health.

A proposed patient to whom notice of the com

mencement of proceedings has been omitted, the court shall
appoint two designated examiners to examine the proposed patient
and report to the court their findings as to the mental condition

of the proposed patient and his need for custody, care, or
treatment in a mental hospital.
(d) The examination shall be held at a hospital or other
medical facility, at the home of the proposed patient. or at
any other suitable place not likely to have a harmful effect
on his health.

A proposed patient to whom notice of the commence

ment of proceedings has been omitted Shall not be required to
submit to an examination against his will, and on the report
of the designated examiners of refusal to submit to an examina
tion the court shall give notice to the proposed patient as
provided under paragraph (b) of this section and order him to
submit to such examination.
(e) If the report of the designated examiners is to the
effect that the proposed patient is not mentally ill, the
court may without taking any further action terminate the
proceedings and dismiss the application. otherwise, it Shall
forthwith fix a date for and give notice of a hearing to be held
not less than 5 nor more than 15 days from receipt of the report.

J(f) The proposed patient. the applicant, and all other
persons to whom notice is required to be given shall be afforded
an opportunity to appear. at the hearing, to testify, and to
present and crosw-examine witnesses, and the court may in its
discretion receive the testimony of any other person.

The

proposed patient shall not be required to be present, and all
persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings shall
be excluded, except as the court may admit persons having a
legitamate interest &n the proceedings.

The hearings shall be

conducted in as informal a manner as may be consistent with
orderly procedure and in a physical setting not likely to have
a harmful effect on the mental health of the proposed patient.
The oourt shall receive all relevant and material evidence
which may be offered and shall not be bound by the rules of
evidence.

An opportunity to be represented by counsel shall

be afforded to every proposed patient, and if neither he nor
others provide counsel, the court shall appoint counsel.
(g) Ir, upon completion of the hearing and consideration
of the record, the court finds that the proposed patient
(1) is mentally ill, and
(2) because of his illness is likely to injure himself or
others if allowed to remain at liberty, or

(3) is in need of custody, care or treatment in a mental
hospital and, because of his illness, lacks sufficient
insight or capacity to make responsible decisions
with respect to his hospitalization,
it shall order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period
or for a temporary observational period not exceeding 6 monthsl
otherwise, it shall

dismi~B

the proceedings.

If the order is

for it" tB1llp8rary-.period the court may at any time pr'or to the
expiration of such period, on the basis of report by the head of
the hospital and such further inquiry as it may deem appropriate,
order indeterminate hospitalization of the patient or dismissal
of the proceedings.
(h) The order of hospitalization shall state whether the
individual shall be detained for an indeterminate or for a

temporary period, then for how long.

Unless otherwise directed

by the court, it shall be the responsibility of the (local
health authority) to assure the carrying out of the order
within such period as the court shall specify.
(i) The court is authorized to appoint a special commis
sioner to assist in the conduct of hospitalization proceedings.
In any ease in which the court refers an application to the
commissioner, the commissioner shall promptly cause the proposed
patient to be examined and on the basis thereof shall either
recommend dismissal of the application or hold a hearing as
provided in this section and make recommendations to the court
regarding the hospitalization of the proposed patient.

(j) The head of the hospital admitting a patient pursuant
to proceedings under this sectIon shall forthwith make a
report of such admission to the (central administration).
Sec. 10. Hospitalization by an agency of the United States.
(al If an individual ordered to be hospitalized pursuant to
the previous aactlon is eligible for hospital care or treat
ment by an agency of the United States, the court, upon receipt
of a certificate from such agency showing that facilities are
available and that the individual is eligible for care or
treatment therein, may order him to be placed in the custody
of such agency for hospitalization.

When any such individual

is admitted pursuant to the order of such court to any hospital
or

institut~on

operated by any agency of the united states

within or wathout the State, he shall be subject to the rules
and regulations of such agency.

The chie£ officer of any

hospital or institution operated by such agency and in which
the individual is so hospitalized. shall with respect to such
individual be vested with the same powers as the heads of
hospitals or the

(central~administration) within

this state

with respect to detention. custody, transfer. conditional
release. or discharge of patients.

JuriSdiction is retained

in the appropriate courts of this State at any time to

inqui~

into the mental condition of an individual so hospitalized,
and to determine the necesilty for continuance of this hospital
ization. and every order of hospitalization issued pursuant to
this section is so conditioned.
(b) An order of a court of competent jurisdietion of
another State, or of the Distriet of Columbia, authorizing
hospitalization of an individual by any ageney of the United
states shall have the same force and effect as to the individual
while in this state or District issuing the order shall be
deemed to have retained jurisdiction of the individual so
hospitalized for the purpose of inquiring into his mental
condition and of determining the necessity for continuance of
his hospitalization, as is provided in subsection (a) of this
section with respect

~o

individuals ordered hospitalized by

the courts of this State.

Consent is hereby given to the

application of the law of the State or District in which is
located the court iSBuing the order for hospitalization with
respect to the authority of the chief officer of any hospital
or institution operated in this State

by~.any

United states to retain custody, transfer.
or discharge the individual hospitalized.

agency of the

conditionalj~elease,

Sec. 11. Transportation. temporary detention.--(a)
Whenever an individual is about to be hospitalized under the
prov.lsions of section 6,7.8,or 9, the (local health authority)
shall, upon the request of a person having a proper iRterest
in the individual's

h~spitalizationt

arrange for the individual's

transportation to the hospital with suitable medical or nursing
attendants and by such means as may be suitable £or his medical
condition.

Whenever practicable, the individual to be hospital

ized shall be permitted to be accompanied by one or more of
his friends or relatives.
(b) Pending his removal to a hospital, a patient taken
into custody or ordered to be hospitalized pursuant to this
Act may be detained in his home, a licensed foster home, or any
other suitable facility under such reasonable conditions as
the {local health authority) may fix, but he shall not, except
because of and during an extreme emergency, be detained in a
nonmedical facility used for the detention of individuals
charged with or convicted of penal offenses.

The (local health

authority) shall take such reasonable measures, including
provision of medical care, as may be necessary to assure proper
care of an individual temporarily detained pursuant to this
section.
Subpart B--Post-Admission Provisions
Sec. 12. Notice of hospitalization.--Whenever a patient
has been admitted to a hospital pursuant to section 6, 7, or
8 on the application of any person other than the patient's

legal guardian, spouse, or next of kin, the head of the

hospital shall immediately notify the patient's legal guardian,
spouse, or next of kin, if known.
Sec. 13. Medical examination of newly admitted patients.-
(a) Every patient admitted pursuant to the pursuant to the
provisions of section 6, 7, 8, or 9 shall be examined by the
staff of the hospital as soon as practicable after his admission.
(b) The head of the hospital shall arrange for examination
by a designated examiner of every patient hospitalized pursuant
to the provisions of section 7 or 8.

If such an examination

is not held within 5 days after the day of admission, or if
a designated examiner fails or refuses after such examination
to certify that in his opinion the patient is mentally ill and
is lijely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at
liberty, the patient shall be immediately discharged.
Sec. 14. Transfer of patients.--(a) The (central adminis
tration) may transfer, or authorize the transfer of, an in
voluntary patient from one hospital to another tf the (central
administration) determines that it would be consistent with
the medical needs of the patient to do so.

Whenever a patient

is transferred, written notice thereof shall be given to his
legal guardian, parents, and spouse, or, if none be known, his
nearest known relative or friend.

In all such transfers, due

consideration shall be given to the relationship of the patient
to his family, legal guardian or friends, so ae to maintain
relationships and encourage visits beneficial to the patient.
(b) Upon receipt of a certificate of an agency of the
United States that facilities are available for the care or

treatment of any individual heretofore ordered hospitalized
pursuant to law or hereafter pursuant to section 9 of this
Act in any hospital for care or treatment of the mentally ill
and that such individual is eligible for care or treatment in a
hospital 'r institution of such agency, the (central adminis
tration) may cause his transfer to such agency of the United
States for hospitalization.

Upon effecting any such transfer.

the court ordering hospitalization. the legal guardian. spouse.
and parents. or if none be known. his nearest known relative
or friend shall be notified thereof immediately by the (central
administration).

No person shall be transferred to an agency

of the United states if he be confined pursuant to conviction
of any felony or misdemeanor or if he has been acquitted of
the charge solely on the ground of mental illness unless

prio~

to transfer the court originally ordering confinement of such
person shall enter an order for such transfer after appropriate
motion and hearing.

Any person transferred as provided in this

section to an agency of the United States shall be deemed to
be

hospitalized

by

such agency pursuant to the original order

of hospitalization.
Sec. 15. Discharge.--The head of a hospital shall as
frequently as practicable, but not less often than every 6
months, examine or cause to be examined every patient and
whenever he determines that the conditions justifying involuntary
hospitalization no longer obtain, discharge the patient and
immediately make a report thereof to the (central administra
tion).

Sec. 16. Convalescent statusl rehospitalization.--(a)
The head of a hospital may release an improved patient on
convalescent status when he believes that such release is in
the best interests of the patient.

Release on convalescent

status shall include provisions for continuing responsibility
to and by the hospital, including a plan of treatment on an
out-patient or nonhospital patient basis.

Prior to the end of

a year on convalescent status and, if he determines that in
view of the condition of the patient hospitalization is no
longer necessary, he shall discharge the patient and make a
report thereof to the (eentral administration).
(b) Prior to such discharge, the head of the hospital from
which the patient is given convalescent status may at any
time readmit the patient.

If there is reason to believe that

it is to the best interests of the patient to be rehospitalized.
the (central administration) or the head of the hospital may
issue an order for the immediate rehospitalization of the
patient.

Such an order, if not voluntarily complied with, shall,

upon the endorsement by a jUdge of a court of record of the
county in which the patient is resident or present. authorize
any health or police officer to take the patient into custody
and transport him to the hospital, or if the order is issued
by the (central administration) to a hospital designated by it.
Sec. 17. Right to releaser application for judicial de term
ination.--(a) Any patient hospitalized under the prov'sions
of section 6, 7, or 8 of this Act who requests to be released
or whose release is requested, in writing, by his legal guardian,

spouse, or adult next of kin shall be released within 48 hours
after receipt of the request except that, upon application to
the court or a judge thereof, whether in session or in vacation,
supported by a certification by the head of the hospital that
in his opinion such release would be unsafe for the patient
or for others, release may be postponed for such period not
to exceed 5 days as the court or a judge thereof may determine
to be necessary for the commencement of proceedings for a
jUdicial determination pursuant to section 9.
(b) The head of the hospital shall provide reasonable
means and arrangements for informing involuntary patients of
their right to release as provided

~n

this section and for

assisting them in making and presenting requests for release.
Sec. 18. Petition for re-examination of order or hospital
ization.--Any patient hospitalized pursuant to section 9
shall be entitled to a re-examination of the order for his
hospitalization on his own petition, or that of his legal
guardian, parent, spouse, relative, or friend, to the (probate)
court of the county in which he resides or is detained.

Upon

receipt of the petition, the court shall conduct or cause to
be conducted by a special commissioner proceedings in accordance
with such section 9. except that such proceedings shall not
be required to be conducted if the petition is filed sooner than
6 months after the issuance of the order of hospitalization
or sooner than 1 year after the filing of a previous petition
under this section.

Part IV--Provisions Applicable to
Patients Generally
Sec.19. Right to humane care and treatment.--Every
patient shall be entitled to humane care and treatment and,
to the extent that facilities, equipment, and personnel are
available, to medical care and treataent in accordance with the
highest standards accepted in medical practice.
Sec. 20. Mechanical restraints.--Mechanical restraints
shall not be applied to a patient unless it is determined by
the head of the hospital or his designee to be required by
the medical needs of the patient.

Every use of a mechanical

restraint and the reasons therefor shall be made a part of the
clinical record of the patient under the signature of the head
of the hospital or his designee.
Sec. 21 Right to communication and visitation. exercise
of civil rights.--(a) Subjectc,to the general rules and regula
tions of the hospital and except to the extent that the head
of the hospital determines that it is necessary for the medical
welfare of the patient to impose restrictions, every patient
shall be entitled
(1) to communicate by sealed mail or otherwise with persons,
including official agencies, inside or outside the
hospital.
(2) to receive visitorsl and
()

to exercise all civil rights, including the right to
dispose of property, execute instruments, make
purchases, enter contractual relationships, and vote,

unless he has been adjudicated incompetent and has
not been restored to legal capacity.
(b) Notwithstanding any limitations authorized under
this section on the right of communication, every patient
shall be entitled to communicate by sealed mail with the
(central administration) and with the court, if any, which
ordered his hospitalization.
(c) Any limitations imposed by the head of the hospital
on the exercise of these

ri~hts

by the patient and the reasons

for such limitations shall be made a part of the clinical
record of the patient.
Sec. 22. writ of habeas corpus.--Any individual detained
pursuant to this Act shall be entitled to the writ of habeas
corpus upon proper petition by himself or a friend to any
court generally empowered to issue the writ of habeas corpus
in the county in which he is detained.
Sec. 2). Disclosure of information.--(a) All certificates,
applications, records, and reports made for the purpose of
this Act and directly or indirectly identifying a patient or
former patient or an individual whose hospitalization has
been sought under this Act shall be kept confidential and shall
not be disclosed by any person except insofar
(1) as the individual identified or his legal guardian,
if any (or, if he is a minor, his parent or legal
guardian). shall consent, or
(2) as disclosure may be necessary to carry out any of
the provisions of this Act, or

(3) as a court may direct upon its determination that
disclosure is necessary for the conduct of proceedings
before it and that failure to make such disclosure
would be contrary to the public interest.
(b) Nothing in this section shall preclude disclosure,
upon proper inquiry, of information as to his current medical
condition, to any members of the family of a patient or to
his relatives or friends.
(c) Any person violating any provision of this section
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of
not more than $500 and imprisonment for not more than 1 year.
Sec. 24. Detention pending judicial determination.-
Nothwithstanding any other provision of this Act, no patient
with respect to whom proceedings for judicial hospitalization
have been commenced shall be released or discharged during
the pendency of such proceedings unless ordered by the court
or a jUdge thereof upon the application of the patient, or
his legal guardian, parent, spouse, or n'xt of kin, or upon the
report'.'of the head of the hospital that the patient may be
discharged with safety.
Sec. 25. Additional powers of (central adrninistration).-
In addition to the specific authority granted by other
provisions of this Act, the (central administration) shall
have authority to prescribe the form of applications, records,
reports, and medical certificates provided for under this Act
and the information required to be contained therein. to
require reports from the head of any hospital relating to the

admission, examination, diagnosis, release, or discharge of
any patients to visit each hospital regularly to review the
commitment procedures of all new patients admitted between
visits. to investigate by personal visit complaints made
by any patient or by any person on behalf of a patient, and
to adopt such rules and regulations not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act as it may find to be reasonably
necessary for proper and efficient hospitalization of the
mentally ill.
Sec. 26. Unwarranted hospitalization or denial of rights,
penalties.--Any person who wilfully causes, or conspires with
or assists another to cause, (1) the unwarranted hospital
ization of any individual under the provisions of this Act,
or (2) the denial to any individual of any of the rights
accorded to him under the provisions of this Act, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $..... or imprisonment not
exceeding •••••••• , or both.
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